Free download irans strategic culture: implications for nuclear policy

After nearly three decades of attempting to manufacture nuclear fuel, Iran has only succeeded in producing prototypes with natural and low-enriched uranium that still need to be tested under rigorous conditions. But even if Iran possessed such technology, proprietary rights disallow manufacturing fuel assemblies for the Bushehr reactor so long as the reactor is under contract with Russia.

Any infringement will terminate Russian safety and performance guarantees for the reactor. Of course, Iran is not alone in these difficulties. The complexity of centrifuge technology compels many countries—including states not subject to international sanctions— to use foreign expertise, especially Russian and European Urenco technology, in their enrichment facilities. China, for example, opted to use Russian centrifuges rather than its own in its enrichment plants. After evaluating the feasibility of operating front-end facilities, both Belgium and Sweden decided it would be a better choice economically to import enriched uranium rather than enrich it domestically.

For Iran, the investment in domestic technology has already been made and is thus considered a sunk cost. No sound strategic energy planning would prioritize nuclear energy in a country like Iran. That means the energy potential of nuclear power in Iran is almost negligible.

So although nuclear energy is environmentally preferable, it is not an economically competitive choice. Since , natural gas prices have plummeted due to newly accessible reserves in shale gas. Today, reeling from the EU oil embargo and oil shipment insurance ban, it hovers around 2.

Consumption of natural gas was estimated at 5. Demand for energy grew at approximately 5 percent per year during the past decade. The need for new capacity in Iran is vital. As with the oil industry, the Iranian gas sector is struggling.

Shrinkage, loss, and flaring accounted for the remaining 14 percent. Positive steps have been taken to resolve this chronic problem. In December the Iranian government launched an economic reform program to phase out the subsidies. Natural gas, which flows directly to the homes of 75 percent of the population, became eight times more expensive. If the removal of subsidies significantly reduced the demand for energy, the saved energy could be several times more than the amount of electricity generated by a few nuclear power plants.

Changing this situation will come at a high price. To stem or reverse these trends and develop new upstream oil and gas projects, Iran needs substantial investment capital and modern technology. Natural gas plants have low capital cost, are rapidly built, offer high reliability, and present the most attractive carbon balance among fossil fuel options.

Moreover, Iran has now acquired significant expertise in producing gas turbines and is largely self-reliant in this area. Of course, it can be argued that conventional resources have limited lifespans and are not environmentally friendly.

But, Iran has other resources as well that are ecologically attractive and have remained largely unexplored. With about clear sunny days a year, 60 percent barren land, and an average of 2, kilowatt hours of solar radiation per square meter, Iran has a great opportunity to tap into solar energy.

Yet, photovoltaic electric power generators remain underdeveloped in Iran. Only a kW solar thermal power-generating system is installed in Shiraz, and about kW capacity is scattered around the country. A mountainous country located between two great bodies of water, Iran also has significant potential to harness wind energy. According to a wind energy survey of 45 suitable sites in the country, Iran could produce at least 6, MW of wind power.

Iran also has several geothermal resources hot spots , with a generation-capacity potential of nearly 7, MW. The need for energy security is often cited by Iranian leaders as a motivation for embarking on a nuclear energy program.

Altogether, the record of nuclear energy in Iran is a bleak one. This damage is likely to have long-term consequences. But Iran does not have that much of a technological edge. Neighboring countries, in contrast to Iran, have unimpeded access to global markets and are likely to bridge the technology gap rapidly. The same world powers that have imposed sanctions on Iran are supporting these nuclear-hopefuls that have opted to make their programs optimally transparent.

In fact, interest in nuclear energy is growing throughout the region. Several competing countries have intensified their attempts to obtain nuclear technology. While the Bushehr reactor was under construction, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates declared their interest in pursuing civilian nuclear programs.

The UAE has sought to become a nonproliferation model by signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement as well as renouncing any ambition to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel to extract plutonium.

Australia signed a bilateral safeguards agreement with the UAE in August These policies have allowed the UAE to procure nuclear reactors with higher safety standards, rugged designs, longer operating lives, less fuel consumption, and less waste production than Iran has.

If other Middle Eastern countries move forward in building nuclear power plants, their much-faster construction rates will offer better economic rates of return. The nuclear industry claims that advanced nuclear reactors such as the AP and AP from Westinghouse can be constructed in as little as three years. The issue, however, remained a political taboo for the Iranian government. Nonetheless, a new phenomenon emerged within the broader Iranian society. These dangers should be neither exaggerated nor neglected.

Problems rooted in this situation emerged even before the reactor became operational. Russian engineers pressured Iran to unload the fuel assemblies of low-enriched uranium from the core of the reactor in order to prevent any damage to them and conduct a thorough cleaning, which further delayed the long-overdue launch. Khurram Ahmad. Download PDF. A short summary of this paper. Specifically to this research, I am grateful to my Department of Defence and Strategic Studies and all faculty members.

My special gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Riffat Hussain, without his kind support it was not possible for me to carry out and finish this research. He is the nicest and most understanding professor I have ever met.

Throughout my research work he always remained a study source of knowledge and guidance for me. It was really wonderful to work under his candid supervision. I am heartily obliged to my family; my father, mother, brother, and my sister. They have encouraged me and stood with me every time I need them.

My deep gratitude is for my hearted friends who have really made this achievement to be earned by me through their moral support during the walk. Regionally, a nuclear Iran would lead the other states of Middle East especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Syria to become a nuclear weapon state.

It may also force Israel to have overt nuclear capability and it would have devastating affects not only in the region but on the whole world. It may not be in the shape of war but in the shape of arms plus nuclear race. As North Korea withdrew from NPT in and nuclear explosion in , the world realizes that there is nothing above for a state except its own interest.

A nuclear Iran will not only be a worrisome factor in the region but will have worldwide implications. And the rationale of this study is to examine the implications of a nuclear Iran for the South Asian region deeply. Introduction The international arena is based on the notion of power politics.

Power politics means international political relations in which each nation attempts to increase its own power or interests by using military or economic coercion. Realism emphasizes the role of the nation-state and makes a broad assumption that all nation-states are motivated by national interests, or, at best, national interests cloaked as moral concerns.

And this power politics leads to political realism. Hans J. Morgenthau was an international relations theorist who taught at the University of Chicago and at the Graduate Center at the City University of New York.

Political realism contains not only a theoretical but also a normative element; 3. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action and 4.

Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. And when these two vital interests have been secured, withal, national interests may take different forms. National power can be defined in terms of military, economic, political, diplomatic, or even cultural resources. In international arena some states may have an interest in securing more resources or land; other states may wish to expand their own political or economic systems into other areas and some states may merely wish to be left alone.

The power of world politics is further strengthened with a tint of the nuclear power. But the fact which they are neglecting is that, greater the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, greater the risk of use of nuclear weapon will be either by design or accident, by a state or a non state actor with catastrophic consequences. Middle East is a region with immense oil reserves, and it has suffered a lot due to conflicts and wrong policies.

The importance of Middle East region cannot be ignored despite being Nations, was the leading work for students of international politics for over a quarter century. Knopf, , pp. The Iraq invasion is one of the attempts by a major power to secure the world from the usage of weapons of mass destruction, while making the rest of the weak states vulnerable.

It is withstanding its international obligations and resisting conjunctive diplomatic pressure to stop it from enriching uranium. The world states through bilateral and multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts are trying to minimize the threat of nuclear.

But , North Korean nuclear explosion showed the international nuclear non proliferation regimes that they are unable to stop or ward off the nuclear intention of any state. India and Pakistan. Problem Statement Middle East is rich in fossil fuels and it can fulfill the demand in the coming decades but the instability of the region raises serious concerns about its status.

Iran through its activities has shown to the world that it has an intention to become a nuclear weapon 5 James M. A survivability threat to Iran from Israel and U. The questions which are going to be addressed in the study are as follows:- 1. What motivates Iran to become a nuclear weapon state? Is Iran domestically capable to build a nuclear device? What would be the likely implications for South Asia, if Iran goes nuclear?

Methodology This is a descriptive study. While conducting the research, the primary sources such as the official statements and archives, secondary sources of data such as articles and books, as well as tertiary sources of data that includes the quoted material from any source will be utilized.

The content analysis of secondary sources such as books, magazines, journals, articles and reports would be used. Furthermore, the internet facility will be utilized to get pertinent reading material. Literature Review The literature reviewed so far provides deep insight into the issue. The historical perspective of Iran in the Middle East, its role in the Middle Eastern region, its nuclear program and also explains Iran and Gulf security and the new world revolution, regime change in Iran, use of terrorism and warfare strategy and the role of United States and other states in the dynamics of relations of the region is outlined in the book Nuclear Iran: A prelude to WW III by Anthony Kairouz The book gives the perspective that how the region has been in the lime light of world politics and how Iran has emerged out of this scenario with quite a different settings as it evolved as a potential nuclear power quite contrary to what US and Israel may have hoped for.

The Cirincion discusses the motives behind states going for nuclear weapons development. He also identifies some apprehensions that states face while developing nuclear weapons and consequently leave out their program. He outlines the certain possibilities of proliferation by the states due to different inclinations and ideological tendencies. However, while discussing the issues of nuclear proliferation he seems to get overboard with the issue of nuclear proliferation because it offers a dichotomy in the overall approach prevailing at the international level to the concept of nuclear proliferation.

Taking it further, Roger Howard in his book, Iran in Crisis: Nuclear Ambitions and the American Response by describes the basic security concerns that Iran claims to have regarding the motive for the development of nuclear weapons. Given the regional tension and the overt hostility of the United States, this book provides an essential background for understanding the likely course of events in the Middle East.

The overall tone of the book remains as representing the realist school of thought in the international relations describing the national security as the pre-requisite for the option of states going nuclear and particularly Iran in this case. Nukes: the Spread of the Nuclear Weapons by Steve Minneus gives an overview of nuclear weapons, their history, the danger they pose, the efforts of countries such as Iran and North Korea to develop and acquire them and the treaties that prevent their proliferation.

Minneus represents the view that nuclear weapons are the prone to obvious proliferation and every country would aspire to have them to guarantee their national security interest and the less effective nature of the international non-proliferation treaties render no restraint in proliferation. However this argument is narrow because the development of nuclear weapons is not a piece of cake, there are certain pre-requisites that kill the motivation of states from going nuclear.

As the author in this case happens to be Iranian, the perspective indicates the worldview of Iran. But the tone of the arguments happens to be Iraq centric and biased. He explains the current structure of the Iranian revolutionary government- the competing centers of power and the major players and the terrorist groups funded and armed by Iran. Schake and Judith S. Yaphe describes that Iran was determined to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range missile systems needed for their delivery and in fact, was well on its way to achieving those objectives.

It also explains why Iran wanted nuclear weapons, the threats it perceived, and how it was pursuing its goals. And also explains the consequences of a nuclear armed Iran especially in context to U. Yaphe and Charles D. The book also tries to analyze the Implications for the region, taking into account the prospects of nonproliferation it explains the U. The literature consulted, understandably, certain limitations consisting of different schools of thought representing different view points on a certain issue.

Furthermore the literature also contains definite biases while belonging to opposing schools of thought or ideologies, yet the focus has been on the objectivity of research and analysis on the bases of keeping in view all the possible aspects of the situation in discussion.

Limitations and Scope The scope of this study is limited to the impacts of Iranian Nuclear program on the South Asian region if Iran overtly openly tests nuclear weapons or uses it or covertly develops nuclear weapons secretly in the guise of peaceful nuclear program acquires nuclear weapons or remains ambiguous.

Very little work has been done in analyzing the threats posed to South Asian region or the implications for South Asia in the wake of Iran going nuclear.

Providing a holistic study of the research questions, the thesis will address this deficiency in literature. The study would not be too significant and up to the soaring standard due to the limitations posed by the resources and time, but the whole hearted effort would be made to address all the considerable issues relating to the goal of the research. Division of the Book The book is divided into four chapters, and covers the research questions in detail.

The first chapter is divided into two parts, the first part highlights the theoretical framework which entails the concept of security dilemma and why states go nuclear in the context of Iranian nuclear program, and the second part focuses on the history of the Iran nuclear program and its evolution to its contemporary status.

The chapter three is divided into three main parts. The first part deals with the regional countries, threat perception, and the second part will explain instability in the region, in the form of nuclear proliferation and the likely war situation. The third part will deal with the international community stance over Iranian nuclear program. Chapter four presents a picture of the critical scenarios of the Iranian nuclear program which includes Iran as an overt nuclear weapon state; as a covert nuclear weapon state and Iran as a nuclear capable state and its implications for the South Asian region and finally, the chapters will be followed by a conclusion.

This chapter is to construct a theoretical context for understanding the Iranian quest for acquiring nuclear weapons. It also focuses on Barry R. Nuclear weapons are unique in their destructiveness and in their lack of direct military utility. Most national leaders time and again express their hope that these weapons will never be used.

Then why do states use their resources to develop these weapons? What are the principal desires on rationale that drives this technology? The rationale behind this is that states acquire nuclear weapons because of i national security, ii prestige, iii domestic politics, iv technology, and v economics. The detailed study is to explain the fact that what possibly are the motives for Iran going nuclear in a hostile international scenario? All the five models mentioned above point towards the realist nature of the international politics, a very well known theory of international relations, as all the models explain the very concept of self-help.

The two major assumptions of realism that are the gist of it are: 10 a. International system is anarchic and b. States will do whatever is necessary to guarantee their security and sovereignty in this Hobbesian jungle.

Nuclear weapons in this regard, are the eventual security guarantors and a source of deterrence in state rivalry. The next country to develop nuclear weapons was the Soviet Union and then Britain and France, chose to go nuclear instead of placing their security in the hands of United States.

In this way, nuclear weapons proliferated from country to country and region to region. According to the realist approach to nuclear proliferation, domestic politics, technology and economics play minor roles and domestic politics are subordinate to supreme national security interests, technology can be acquired one way or the other, and the expense of a 9 Ibid, 10 Ibid. Iran is a peripheral state, and states that are on periphery of the international system are not economically integrated with the core states and feel far more acute threats to their national security.

As a result of this geographical misfortune, the thought persists; the country intends to build nuclear weapons for the purpose of security.

Iran is worried in this context. For this reason, nuclear weapons are seen as security guarantors. Nuclear capability would guarantee Iran an improved bargaining position with regards to its enemies. Furthermore, Tehran is of the view that the new regime in Baghdad would be as belligerent towards Tehran as was its predecessor.

The only strategy Iran could follow against the U. The foremost reason is the Palestinian struggle, the clerics and their cronies view it as a fundamental iniquity committed against a group of poor people. Their respective foreign policy stances seem to be the point of disagreement between Tehran and Ankara. The other source of enmity can be attributed to the issue of Central Asia and the Caspian region. Both states have vital interests in the region, principally with the exportation of Caspian energy.

The two states were at times on the brink of war over disputed oil fields in the Caspian. So, the enthusiasts of nuclear weapons in Iran further rationalize the firmer stance on deterrence in Iranian military doctrine. Prestige The second factor that drives states to get nuclear weapons is prestige. States conceive that nuclear capability makes states modern, legitimate, and strong.

They are tempted by the way in which each nuclear state views itself, its national identity, and its role in the world politics and believe that nuclear weapons are essential to satisfy and fulfill their national 28 Ibid. Failure to reach an agreement would have heralded confrontation and possibly military actions. The deal opens a new window of opportunity for enhancing regional security. Outcome to benefit all. Iran has done significant concessions.

The chances for going nuclear under the circumstances are almost certainly zilch. The IAEA inspections regime is effective enough. Still Iran has achieved a better deal in comparison with the starting position in The nuclear potential, especially the right to enrich uranium, by far exceeds its economic and scientific research needs.

There are three alternatives to the agreement. First, a full-blown war in the Persian Gulf as a result of airstrikes delivered against Iran to make the region mired in chaos. Second, Iran going nuclear with all the implications to face. Third, an airstrike against a nuclear Iran to be followed by a nuclear regional conflict. To avoid these three scenarios the agreement must be strictly complied with by all the parties.

The program should be curtailed, the IAEA should conduct its activities unhindered, transparence should be guaranteed and in case of compliance Iran should have sanctions lifted to join the world community again.

Perhaps, additional agreements and further coordination of efforts will be needed in the future. Lessons to draw. Diplomacy should be given a priority. Despite this record of pragmatic decisionmaking, the conventional wisdom that has dominated the international security scholarship on Iran's nuclear policy suffers from several of the shortcomings introduced above.

This statement is a mischaracterization of both historical events and Iran's interests. Second, by viewing Iran exclusively in terms of the Islamic Revolution and ignoring the Iran-Iraq War, Sebenius and Singh incorrectly assert that Iran's overriding interest is the survival of its regime rather than national security and the defense of its territory.

The failure of scholars such as Sebenius and Singh to examine Iranian sources and appreciate the impact of the Iran-Iraq War is one of the primary reasons why the Islamic Republic has remained a seemingly impenetrable puzzle, especially with regard to its nuclear ambitions, and why the conventional wisdom on Iran has shed little light on that subject. Further, the scholarship on Iran's nuclear program has focused overwhelmingly on subjects such as the dangers that a nuclear-armed Iran would present to its neighbors and the world, 18 the specific methods that should be used to prevent Iran from weaponizing, 19 and whether Iran actually wants nuclear weapons.

Indeed, in analyses of Tehran's nuclear file, the Iran-Iraq War has come to serve merely as a metaphor. When commentators mention the war, they do so almost exclusively with superficial references to the founder and first supreme leader of the Islamic Republic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's likening his decision to end the war to drinking a chalice of poison. Will he give up his regime's decades-long struggle with the United States to save his country and its faltering economy?

It is also representative of how scholars and policymakers have failed to appreciate the depth and breadth of the Iran-Iraq War's significance, thus preventing them from accurately understanding and applying the lessons of the war to the nuclear issue. The Islamic Revolution of —79 was a movement of several different groups that were united most strongly in their opposition to the Pahlavi dynasty and the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah. Khomeini strongly objected to a number of the shah's domestic and foreign policies, and denounced nuclear technology as a waste of the country's resources.

Shortly after they established the new Islamic Republic, Iraq attacked Iran. The Iran-Iraq War is part of a long history of conflict between the rulers and peoples of those lands. Ultimately, however, the causes of the war were political and proximate, and it was the Iranian Revolution that formed its most significant catalyst. To Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, who presided over a Sunni-dominated, secular government ruling a Shi'i majority, 27 these policies presented a threat to his power.

At the same time, Iran appeared to be in a vulnerable position, as violent disputes over the post-revolutionary order persisted into its second year. Saddam decided to take the opportunity to launch what he intended to be a quick military operation to defeat the revolution and safeguard his rule and, while he was at it, to seize the oil-rich territory in southwestern Iran and assert his leadership of the Arab world.

After a year of steadily worsening relations and several months of border clashes, Iraqi forces invaded Iran on September 22, , marking the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War. What Saddam thought would be a swift and easy strike to check the revolutionary regime quickly transformed into a brutal and drawn-out conflict that instead revitalized the flagging revolution. Iran then pursued the retreating forces into Iraq in the summer of , but was unable to gain or hold much ground.

The war broadened as it stalled, entangling the rest of the Middle East and both superpowers and spreading from the land to the Tanker War in the Persian Gulf and several series of aerial attacks on civilian areas, known as the War of the Cities. Although neither side emerged as the clear victor, the war had a profound impact on both countries. The war's eight years amount to about one-fifth of the life of the Islamic Republic. Casualty figures remain highly uncertain, but estimates of Iranian deaths range from , to , Finally, the Iran-Iraq War remains a central component of Iran's national identity.

Although it was a disaster for the country, the leaders of the Islamic Republic emerged from the war smarter and stronger. Many of its war veterans now hold key positions in the government and military. For the revolution and the regime it brought to power, the Iran-Iraq War was a test, one that provided Iran with important lessons that have driven its policies since. This failure has contributed materially to skewed representations of the Islamic Republic.

Finally, the war's significance stems from the way Iranian leaders view the role of history, in general, and the history of the Iran-Iraq War, in particular, in shaping Iran's national identity and foreign policy outlook in the present day. Yet, for many Iranians, history and, again, that of the war in particular, is inextricable from the present.

Hence, the Iran-Iraq War has great bearing on every aspect of Iranian decisionmaking, including the nuclear file. One of the West's key beliefs about the Islamic Republic is that the regime pursues aggressive policies that threaten Iran's neighbors and international security.

That outlook had an immense impact both on U. He also appealed to the conservative Gulf monarchs, whose fear of the Iranian Revolution prompted them to create the Gulf Cooperation Council in and to provide substantial support to Iraq during the war.

In a March speech before the U. Iran's view of its actions in the Iran-Iraq War and thereafter is diametrically opposed to the understanding outlined above. The most fundamental feature of the Iranian narrative fits the defensive realist model and holds that Iran faces numerous threats to its national security and territorial integrity and has persistently fought to defend itself from those threats. Indeed, that same view, more than any other factor, defined Iran's prosecution of and policies during the war.

Among these experiences, the outcomes were that in this period national security and the preservation of territorial integrity were in such a difficult position that the regime's decisionmakers and people have become determined to deter neighbors and great powers from invading Iran's territory [again].

In their publications, the Revolutionary Guards emphasize that restoring Iran's security and territorial integrity was the goal of Iran's strategy throughout the war, and Iran's actions in the war support that claim. Although Tehran's decision to continue the war in by invading Iraq is often given as evidence of the regime's aggression, in Iran the invasion is depicted in defensive terms, as essential to securing its territory and borders.

The centrality of the defensive realist notions of survival and national defense to Iran's prosecution of the war is also evident in how Iranian sources characterize the conflict's outcome.

In their publications, the Revolutionary Guards portray the war as a victory for Iran because Iran successfully defended its territory and because Iraq failed to achieve its goals of gaining sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab the river that runs along part of the Iran-Iraq border and occupying pieces of Iranian land.

In their view, the aggression against Iran that the war embodied has continued, as the country exists in an anarchical system without security guarantees and a region in which the inability to meet one's basic security needs can lead to the loss of sovereignty. Therefore, the effort to derive strategic lessons from the war stems also from the view of the conflict as ongoing.

Similar language is also used to characterize the conflict over Iran's nuclear file. In , a Tehran Friday prayer leader described U. Just as Iran's political and security establishments saw and portrayed the nuclear crisis through the lens of the war, President Rouhani's government has also tried to frame the nuclear negotiations and resulting deal within the framework of the war.

Iranian leaders define the Iran-Iraq War as a conflict between Iran and a powerful group of states. In many cases, the IRGC asserts that increased international involvement in the conflict came as a result of Iranian advances and with the intention of ensuring that Iraq did not lose the war.

Such was the case after Iran's invasion of Iraq in July Despite its mixed results, the invasion demonstrated Iran's tenacity and ability to challenge Iraq militarily. According to IRGC sources, that challenge was deemed unacceptable by those who feared an Iranian victory, something that then seemed possible. The support that key players gave to Iraq continues to shape Tehran's outlook today, with many Iranian leaders viewing the United States and its regional allies e.

He recounted his discussion with a Saudi official some twenty years prior, during which Rouhani raised the issue of the kingdom's aid to Iraq during the war, enumerating the many ways Saudi Arabia had contributed to Iraq's efforts. According to Rouhani, the Saudi official boasted that there were in fact many other contributions, which he then proceeded to list. The two key features of Iran's understanding of the Iran-Iraq War outlined above have direct and substantial bearing on Iran's nuclear policies and on the continuing efforts to implement the JCPOA.

Will the election of Hassan Rouhani as Iran's president provide a new opportunity for greater U. A peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear crisis and the continued strengthening of relative pragmatists in the Tehran government could lead to cooperation between Iran and the United States in Afghanistan. A peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue and reduced tensions between Iran and the United States are likely to reduce Iranian incentives for aiding Taliban elements.

Moderate leaders in Iran are likely to oppose arming of insurgents and instead advocate a more diplomatic approach. The United States should engage the Iranian government in bilateral discussions regarding Afghanistan and pursue joint activities that would serve their mutual interests and build much-needed trust.

The United States should attempt to cooperate with Iran in countering narcotics in Afghanistan. The United States should encourage efforts to bring Tehran and Kabul to an agreement over water sharing. Washington should encourage joint Iranian-Pakistani projects if a final nuclear deal with Iran is reached; U.

Include Iran in regional and international discussions on Afghan security, especially if Iran comes to accept any residual international force in Afghanistan.